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WHERE LAW MEETS EQUITY: EVIDENTIARY 
HEARINGS UNDER CALIFORNIA BUSINESS 
AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 7031 
Eric R. Reed*
           California’s contractor licensing statutes severely penalize 
unlicensed contractors. Even a brief license disruption may result in a 
contractor being unable to collect unpaid invoices or having to disgorge 
money received for past work. Courts began developing a “substantial 
compliance” exception to these statutes shortly after the legislature 
enacted them. This institutional tug-of-war prompted the legislature to 
codify the exception in section 7031(e) of the California Business and 
Professions Code, and, later, to create a unique stand-alone procedure 
for adjudicating substantial compliance. Section 7031(e) refers to this 
procedure as an “evidentiary hearing” but gives little guidance about 
how to conduct such a hearing. 
           This Article first explores the evidentiary hearing’s equitable 
roots in the judicial substantial compliance doctrine. Next, it discusses 
how counsel and judicial officers can use substantial compliance 
hearings to confront and resolve disputes involving contractors with 
licensing problems. Lastly, the Article concludes by proposing minor 
revisions to section 7031(e) that will clarify existing ambiguities, and, 
ideally, ensure the long-term viability of the statute and the unique 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
California law provides few protections for those who perform 
construction services without a license. A contractor experiencing the 
briefest license disruption may find him or herself unable to collect 
unpaid invoices or forced to disgorge money received for past work. 
Appellate courts spent much of the twentieth century developing a 
“substantial compliance” exception to protect contractors whose 
technical transgressions or excusable neglect did not warrant their 
harsh punishments under California law. The judiciary’s institutional 
tug-of-war with regulators prompted the legislature to codify the 
courts’ equitable concerns and to create a procedural tool to address 
these concerns without compromising the state’s regulatory aims. This 
procedural tool—an “evidentiary hearing” guaranteed by Business 
and Professions Code section 7031(e)1—is akin to a pleading 
challenge or dispositive motion. Little guidance is found in case law, 
court rules, regulations, or even section 7031 itself about how to 
conduct such a hearing. 
This Article first explores the evidentiary hearing’s equitable 
roots in the judicial substantial compliance doctrine. Next, it discusses 
how counsel and judicial officers can use subdivision (e) hearings to 
confront and resolve disputes involving contractors with licensing 
problems. The Article concludes by proposing minor revisions to 
section 7031 that will clarify existing ambiguities, and, ideally, ensure 
the long-term viability of the statute and the unique procedure it 
created. 
II. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 7031 AND THE 
JUDICIAL SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE 
Section 7031 of California’s Business and Professions Code 
serves as a “shield and sword” for consumers litigating with their 
contractors.2 The shield, subdivision (a), deprives the unlicensed 
contractor of standing to seek compensation for services requiring a 
license.3 This applies even if the consumer knows the contractor is not 
 
 1. The author refers to the California Code unless noted otherwise. 
 2. See White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 443 (Ct. App. 2009) (“In 2001, the 
Legislature complemented the shield created by subdivision (a) of section 7031 by adding a sword 
that allows persons who utilize unlicensed contractors to recover compensation paid to the 
contractor for performing unlicensed work.”). 
 3. Subdivision (a) states as follows at the time of writing:  
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licensed and encourages performance nonetheless.4 The sword, 
subdivision (b), allows the consumer to sue for disgorgement of all 
amounts paid under the contract.5 This includes both labor and 
materials.6 The legislature considers the “harsh and unfair results” to 
contractors outweighed by “the important public policy of deterring 
licensing violations and ensuring that all contractors are licensed.”7 
A.  The Origins of Business and Professions Code Section 7031 
The current section 7031 began its life in 1929 as part of the 
original California State License Law (CSLL).8 The CSLL created the 
Contractors License Bureau, the predecessor of today’s Contractors 
State License Board (the “Board”), and contained the basic statutory 
framework the fledgling agency would use to better regulate the state’s 
quickly expanding rolls of professional builders. Section 12 of the 
CSLL contained much of subdivision (a)’s current “shield” language 
and criminalized acting in the capacity of a contractor without 
 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or 
acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover 
in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of 
compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required 
by this chapter without alleging that he or she was a duly licensed contractor at all 
times during the performance of that act or contract regardless of the merits of the 
cause of action brought by the person, except that this prohibition shall not apply 
to contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to 
comply with Section 7029.  
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a) (Deering 2020). 
 4. See Hydrotech Sys., Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1991) (holding that an 
out-of-state subcontractor was barred from recovering unpaid invoices despite the client and 
general contractor promising to pay subcontractor regardless of licensing status). 
 5. Subdivision (b) states as follows at the time of writing: “Except as provided in subdivision 
(e), a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court 
of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor 
for performance of any act or contract.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b). 
 6. See Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 289–90 (Ct. App. 
2010) (citing White, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 444–45). 
 7. Id. at 290; see also MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., 
115 P.3d 41, 46–47 (Cal. 2005) (“Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the 
importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs 
any harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying 
violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in the courts of this state.” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Hydrotech, 803 P.2d at 374)). 
 8. See Act of Aug. 14, 1929, ch. 791, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1591, 1591–92 (“An act providing for 
the registration of contractors, and defining the term contractor; providing the method of obtaining 
licenses to engage in the business of contracting, and fixing the fees for such licenses; providing 
the method of suspension and cancellation of such licenses; and prescribing the punishment for 
violation of the provisions of this act.”). 
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registering with the newly-established Bureau.9 Depriving unlicensed 
contractors of standing to enforce outstanding debts for their services 
was not a novel remedial concept, but rather, a repurposing of the 
common law tenet that a contract is void ab initio if created in violation 
of law.10 Pre-CSLL authorities usually upheld licensing requirements 
in professions such as contracting and architecture so long as the 
regulating entity intended them to protect the public interest, and not 
simply generate revenue.11 
B.  Courts Develop the “Substantial Compliance Doctrine” to 
Preserve the Standing of Unlicensed Contractors That Satisfy 
Certain Criteria 
It did not take long for consumers to appreciate the CSLL’s 
tactical potential. Anyone sued by one’s contractor for unpaid bills 
could gain tremendous leverage—or dispose of the case entirely—by 
showing the contractor ran afoul of the CSLL, and thus lacked 
standing under section 12.12 Courts frequently found it difficult to 
stand aside while defendants used technical licensing transgressions 
to avoid paying legitimate debts for competently performed 
construction services. A doctrine of substantial compliance took shape 
within a decade. The doctrine’s progenitor is recognized case Citizens 
State Bank v. Gentry,13 a 1937 intermediate appellate opinion arising 
out of the reconstruction of a theater property damaged during the 
1933 Long Beach earthquake.14 
 
 9. See Holm v. Bramwell, 67 P.2d 114, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) (“‘Any person who acts in 
the capacity of a contractor [or subcontractor] within the meaning of this act without a license as 
herein provided, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor,’ and shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment 
as described therein.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Act of Aug. 14, 1929 § 12)). 
 10. See id. (“It has been repeatedly held that a party to an illegal contract may not rest his 
cause or recover judgment based upon such void agreement.”). 
 11. See Renee A. Mangini, Comment, The Contractors’ State License Law: From Strict 
Adherence to Substantial Compliance, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 618 (1987) (“The courts have 
further established the rule that when a licensing statute is enacted for the protection of the public, 
a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute is void. In applying this rule to 
the [CSLL] . . . the effect is that any contract with an unlicensed contractor is void at the outset.” 
(citing Wood v. Krepps, 143 P. 691, 692–93 (Cal. 1914))); Payne v. De Vaughn, 246 P. 1069, 1071 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1926) (citing Levinson v. Boas, 88 P. 825, 828 (Cal. 1907) (denying an architect’s 
claim for professional fees because he lacked license)). 
 12. See Holm, 67 P.2d at 115 (contractor sued owner who refused to pay for masonry work; 
court denied contractor’s claim because masonry subcontractor, while licensed at time of 
performance, did not hold license when he signed the subcontract). 
 13. 67 P.2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937). 
 14. Id. at 365. See generally Lawrence Jennings Imel, Comment, Substantial Compliance with 
the Contractors’ State License Law: An Equitable Doctrine Producing Inequitable Results, 34 LOY. 
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The contractor in Gentry held a license under his own name when 
first hired by the owner.15 He renewed his license mid-project and 
requested the bureau re-issue it in the name of his newly formed 
corporation.16 Later, the contractor sued the owner for unpaid bills.17 
The owner accused him of performing construction services without a 
license and moved for nonsuit because the contractor no longer held 
the license in place when he began working.18 The trial court denied 
nonsuit.19 The court of appeal affirmed the ruling on equitable 
grounds: 
In our opinion, where a manifestly unjust and inequitable 
result would follow a holding that plaintiff contractor was 
without capacity to sue on his contract, the individual 
plaintiff in whose name the license stood at the time the 
contract was made and the corporate entity organized by him 
in whose name the license stood at the time the cause of 
action accrued, should be considered as one.20 
The California Supreme Court encountered a similar situation 
nine years later in Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc.21 Gatti signed 
a residential building contract with defendant and hired Moore as the 
project’s foreman.22 Gatti and Moore decided for a mid-project to 
operate as a partnership.23 Defendant consented to the arrangement but 
later refused to pay because Gatti and Moore, while individually 
licensed, violated the CSLL by not obtaining a separate partnership 
license.24 The trial court entered judgment for the two contractors 
despite this violation.25 The supreme court affirmed. Citing Gentry, it 
described Gatti and Moore as having “substantially complied” with 
the CSLL by maintaining their individual licenses during the project: 
 
L.A. L. REV. 1539, 1543–55 (2001) (surveying the doctrine’s development over its first six 
decades). 
 15. Gentry, 67 P.2d at 365. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 366–67. 
 21. 166 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1946). 
 22. Id. at 265. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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If defendant is allowed to defeat plaintiffs’ legitimate claim 
on this technical ground, resting on an unnecessarily strict 
construction of the statutory provision for the additional joint 
contractor’s license and denying any effect to the 
combination license in fact issued to plaintiffs and a third 
person as above recited, the legislative scheme in relation to 
the licensing of contractors, intended “for the safety and 
protection of the public,” would become an unwarranted 
shield for the avoidance of a just obligation.26 
Lone dissenter Justice Douglas L. Edmonds characterized the 
decision as “directly contrary to the plain and positive language” of 
the CSLL.27 The majority encroached on the legislature’s authority to 
regulate the contracting business, he reasoned, by creating an ad hoc 
exemption to a comprehensive statutory framework: 
There can be no substantial compliance with such a statute. 
Wisely or unwisely, the Legislature has specified that two 
persons individually licensed may not, as partners, engage in 
the contracting business without having obtained a license in 
the name of the partnership. Unquestionably, that 
requirement is within the scope of legislative action, and, 
therefore, beyond the reach of judicial consideration.28 
Courts spent the next two decades exploring the doctrine’s 
boundaries.29 An elemental approach emerged in 1966’s Latipac, Inc. 
v. Superior Court.30 Justice Tobriner’s majority opinion created a 
three-part test to determine which contractor-plaintiffs could invoke 
its protections: 
(1) “that plaintiff held a valid license at the time of 
contracting”; 
(2) “that plaintiff readily secured a renewal of that license”; 
and 
 
 26. Id. at 266. 
 27. Id. at 267 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. (citing Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 75 P.2d 599, 603–04 (Cal. 1938)). 
 29. See, e.g., Loving & Evans v. Blick, 204 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1949); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball 
Sons, 308 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1957); Weiman v. Superior Ct., 336 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1959); Bierman v. 
Hagstrom Constr. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Ct. App. 1959); Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. Levant, 6 
Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1960). 
 30. 411 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1966). 
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(3) “that the responsibility and competence of plaintiff’s 
managing officer were officially confirmed throughout the 
period of performance of the contract.”31 
The court’s most recent appointee, Justice Stanley Mosk, penned 
a dissent joined by Chief Justice Traynor and Justice McComb. He 
described substantial compliance as a “dangerous doctrine” and 
quickly picked up where now-retired Justice Edmonds left off two 
decades earlier.32 Justice Mosk considered the latest iteration of the 
doctrine a foray into legislative territory that simply ignored those 
statutes it found troublesome.33 The majority dismissed the idea that 
its decision created or perpetuated institutional tension: “For nearly 
three decades we have developed and applied to cases arising under 
section 7031 the doctrine of ‘substantial compliance’; during that 
entire period the Legislature has indicated no hint of disapproval of 
this construction.”34 
Latipac left open whether contractors must satisfy all three factors 
to establish substantial compliance.35 Subsequent lower court 
decisions suggested they did.36 The high court next visited the doctrine 
in 1985. Asdourian v. Araj37 described the Latipac factors as 
“considerations which might warrant application of the doctrine.”38 
Chief Justice Bird’s majority opinion described the judiciary’s core 
inquiry as deciding whether a contractor’s conduct satisfied the core 
policy of the CSLL, i.e., “to protect the public from the perils incident 
 
 31. Id. at 567. 
 32. Id. at 576. 
 33. See id. at 577 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“Although one may well be sympathetic to the 
equitable arguments of the contractor, such arguments should be addressed to the Legislature rather 
than the court; the Contractors License Law . . . is a comprehensive regulatory statute the wisdom 
of which is not subject to our review.”). At least one contemporary commentator characterized 
Latipac as expanding rather than reciting the doctrine. See Paul E. Principe, Case Note, Substantial 
Compliance with Contractors Licensing Statutes: Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court (Cal. 1966), 7 
SANTA CLARA LAW. 157, 163 (1966) (“The majority . . . have relied on precedent and have 
somewhat ignored questions of legislative intent in sections 7031 and 7068.1. Those sections 
appear to require strict compliance but the courts have not so interpreted them.”). 
 34. Latipac, 411 P.2d at 567 (majority opinion). 
 35. See id. (“Since all these elements here concur, we need not determine whether any of them, 
singly or in more limited combination, would constitute ‘substantial compliance.’”). 
 36. See, e.g., Brown v. Solano Cnty. Bus. Dev., Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Ct. App. 1979); 
Weeks v. Merritt Bldg. & Constr. Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 1974); Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior 
Ct., 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1972), abrogated by Asdourian v. Araj, 696 P.2d 95, 100 (Cal. 
1985); Frank v. Kozlovsky, 91 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1970). 
 37. 696 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1985). 
 38. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
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to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.”39 Like 
the court in Latipac, the majority highlighted the legislature’s silence 
as tacit acceptance of common law safeguards for “innocent” 
contractors whose technical CSLL violations prevent them from 
collecting valid debts: “It has now been almost five decades since the 
doctrine was first applied. The Legislature has manifested no 
disapproval. In the limited and extraordinary circumstances in which 
it is applied, the policies underlying the doctrine remain 
compelling.”40 
Asdourian tied up Latipac’s loose ends by holding that a 
contractor need not satisfy all three factors if the facts of the case 
“clearly indicate substantial compliance which satisfies the policy of 
the Contractors License Law.”41 Justice Mosk, the only remaining 
justice of the Latipac era, penned his second dissent on the subject. 
“To achieve what they perceive as a desirable result,” he wrote, “the 
majority employ equity in a simple contract action and in doing so 
they emasculate a legislative enactment that is clear and 
unambiguous.”42 
C.  The Legislature Abolishes Judicial Substantial Compliance 
Asdourian and its immediate progeny represented the high-water 
mark of judicial substantial compliance.43 The legislature responded 
to the high court’s equitable muscle-flexing by passing Assembly Bill 
841, a Board-sponsored bill introduced during the 1989–1990 session. 
The bill abolished the doctrine by appending twelve words to the end 
of section 7031 as subdivision (d): “The judicial doctrine of substantial 
compliance shall not apply to this section.”44 
In effect, the legislature wiped fifty years of case law off the 
books as of January 1, 1990. This rebuke of judicial encroachment, as 
exemplified by Asdourian, served “as a warning to the courts that 
public policy behind [section 7031] was strong, despite its harsh 
 
 39. Id. at 103 (quoting Davis Co. v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (Ct. App. 1969)). 
 40. Id. at 102. 
 41. Id. at 100. 
 42. Id. at 107 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 43. See Knapp Dev. & Design v. Pal-Mal Props., Ltd., 219 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Asdourian, 696 P.2d at 101 (finding the presence of just one Latipac factor enough to 
establish substantial compliance)). 
 44. Act of Sept. 12, 1989, ch. 368, § 1, 1989 Cal. Stat. 1509, 1509 (current version at CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (Deering 2020)). 
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impact upon the unlicensed person who had performed work in good 
faith.”45 The amended statute also required contractors to establish 
their licensure immediately upon filing a collection action by 
“produc[ing] a verified certificate of licensure” from the Board or else 
face certain dismissal.46 
D.  The Legislature “Conditionally Resurrects” the Doctrine and 
Introduces the Evidentiary Hearing 
Contractors with brief mid-project suspensions or other minor 
licensing issues found themselves without standing to initiate 
collection actions unless the underlying contract predated the 1990 
amendment.47 The industry reacted quickly. A year later the Southern 
California Contractor’s Association sponsored legislation “to ‘ensure 
that a contractor’s ability to operate as a licensed contractor is not 
jeopardized because of a technical error or oversight by the 
contractor.’”48 Assembly Bill 1382 sought to amend section 7031 to 
include a “special exemption” for contractors who could demonstrate 
substantial compliance with the CSLL.49 The Board initially opposed 
the bill out of concern it would “make life easier” for unlicensed 
contractors but later withdrew its opposition.50 It passed unanimously 
in both the Assembly and Senate.51 The following became subsection 
(d) of the newly amended section 7031: 
The judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not 
apply to this section, except that a court may determine that 
there has been substantial compliance with licensure 
requirements, for purposes of this section, if it is shown at 
an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly licensed 
 
 45. Edmund L. Regalia, Is the Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Licensing of Contractors 
Still Alive and Well?, 14 MILLER & STARR, REAL EST. NEWSALERT, May 2004, no. 5 , at 1, 2. 
 46. Act of Sept. 12, 1989, § 1. 
 47. See G.E. Hetrick & Assoc., Inc. v. Summit Constr. & Maint. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 
809 (Ct. App. 1992) (“In the case at bar, Hetrick, Inc. is entitled to rely on the statutorily 
disapproved doctrine of substantial compliance with the Contractors License Law, under the 
authority of Hydrotech. The contract and performance at issue in this suit precede the 1989 
amendments to section 7031, which are not to be applied retroactively.”). 
 48. Constr. Fin., LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 581 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting S. COMM. ON BUS., PROF. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, 1991–1992 Reg. 
Sess., at 2 (Cal. 1991) (amended May 15, 1991)). 
 49. S. COMM. ON BUS., PROF. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, at 2. 
 50. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFS., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1382, 1991–1992 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 
1991). 
 51. See id. at 1. 
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contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately 
preceding the performance of the act or contract for which 
compensation is sought, that the persons’ category of 
licensure would have authorized the performance of that act 
or contract, and that noncompliance with the licensure 
requirement was the result of (1) inadvertent clerical error, or 
(2) other error or delay not caused by the negligence of the 
person.52 
With statutory substantial compliance in place, the legislature 
turned its attention to another problem created by the 1990 
amendment. The glut of certificate requests received by the Board in 
the wake of the amendment caused a six-month backlog at the 
agency.53 Many licensed contractors began losing their cases only 
because they could not produce a certificate in time.54 The Board 
sponsored an amendment to section 7031 during the 1992–1993 
session requiring contractors to produce a certificate only when the 
opposing party controverted the contractor’s license status.55 The 
Board sponsored yet another amendment during the 1993–1994 
session to clarify that “contractors still had the burden of proving 
licensure and there was no need for persons they were suing for 
compensation to produce the verified certificate.”56 
E.  Disgorgement: Consumers Get a Sword 
The flurry of amendments in the 1990s did not change section 
7031’s defensive character. It remained focused on the contractor, or 
rather, on depriving unlicensed contractors a forum in which to 
enforce their legal rights. The statute served as a shield to ward off 
collection lawsuits but stopped short of providing a remedy to 
aggrieved consumers. These consumers still needed to pursue out-of-
pocket losses against an unlicensed contractor in the same manner as 
they would against a licensed contractor, i.e., by prevailing in a 
conventional breach of contract or construction defect action. 
 
 52. Act of Oct. 8, 1991, ch. 632, § 1, 1991 Cal. Stat. 2936, 2937 (emphasis added). 
 53. See Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 479 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 54. See id.; see also Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 437 (Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting ASSEMB. COMM. ON CONSUMER PROT., GOV’T EFFICIENCY AND ECON. DEV., 
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 2413, 1991–1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992)). 
 55. See Act of July 16, 1992, ch. 229, § 1, 1992 Cal. Stat. 1019, 1019. 
 56. Womack, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (emphasis omitted) (citing Act of Oct. 4, 1993, ch. 797, 
§ 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. 4357, 4358). 
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This changed when the legislature passed Assembly Bill 678, 
which “add[ed] a sword remedy to the hiring party’s litigation 
arsenal.”57 The bill added the following subdivision to section 7031 
effective January 1, 2002: “A person who utilizes the services of an 
unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the 
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”58 
The bill’s final floor analysis cited a recent Court of Appeal 
opinion as highlighting the need for a built-in consumer remedy to 
round out the statute’s defensive provisions: 
According to the sponsor, this bill is intended to address the 
recent case of Cooper v. Westbrook Torrey Hills, LP (2000) 
81 Cal. App. 4th 1294, in which the court . . . referred to the 
Business and Professions Code, Section 7031(a) prohibiting 
an unlicensed contractor from recovering fees, but not 
requiring any refund of compensation already paid to the 
contractor. Cooper relied on Culbertson v. Cizek (1964) 225 
Cal. App. 2d 451, 473, in which the court permitted the 
unlicensed contractor to offset “as a defense against sums 
due the plaintiffs any amounts that would otherwise be due 
Cizek under his contract.” This bill is intended to clearly state 
that those using the services of unlicensed contractors are 
entitled to bring an action for recovery of compensation 
paid.59 
The initial version of Assembly Bill 678 denied disgorgement “if 
the person knew that the contractor was unlicensed prior to making 
any payments to the contractor.”60 The Senate removed this provision 
from the final bill.61 This meant subdivision (a) remained a complete 
defense and placed the risk of bad faith “squarely on the unlicensed 
contractor’s shoulders.”62 Contractors found themselves subject to 
 
 57. Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 284 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 58. Act of Sept. 4, 2001, ch. 226, § 1, 2001 Cal. Stat. 2094, 2095. 
 59. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 678, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess., at 
2 (Cal. 2001) (as amended July 3, 2001). 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. See id. at 3. 
 62. Hydrotech Sys. Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370, 376 (Cal. 1991). 
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disgorgement even if “induced to enter and perform an illegal contract 
by a false promise to pay.”63 
III.  THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN CASE LAW—1993 TO PRESENT 
Section 7031’s substantial compliance provision—originally 
codified at subdivision (d), and now at (e)—has evolved but remains 
largely intact since its 1993 enactment.64 The subsequent decades 
produced dozens of published opinions in the high court and all 
appellate districts analyzing the doctrine’s tortuous evolution and 
applying the statute’s multi-part test in diverse factual and legal 
contexts.65 The statute and its annotations, however, devote little 
attention to how or when the trial court and litigants should actually 
conduct evidentiary hearings under the statute. 
Only a minority of published opinions describe the lower court 
conducting a stand-alone, pre-trial hearing dedicated to taking 
evidence about a contractor’s substantial compliance.66 The most 
common practice is using summary adjudication or summary 
judgment procedures in lieu of, or as a proxy for, a subdivision (e) 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See S. COMM. ON BUS., PROS. & ECON. DEV., ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1793, 2015–2016 Reg. 
Sess., at 1–2, 4 (Cal. 2016). A minor revision to subdivision (e)’s multi-part substantial compliance 
test in 2016 eliminated element 3 of (e), i.e., that the contractor “did not know or reasonably should 
not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act commenced.” Id. 
at 4. The change “clarifie[d] existing law to ensure that properly licensed and law abiding 
construction firms are not placed at fatal monetary risk, by limiting the recovery time and 
disgorgement amount to monies paid to the contractor for work performed while the contractor was 
not properly licensed.” Id. at 6. 
 65. See, e.g., MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., 115 P.3d 
41 (Cal. 2005); Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Ct. App. 2015); Alatriste v. Cesar’s 
Exterior Designs, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (Ct. App. 2010); White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 434 (Ct. App. 2009); WSS Indus. Constr., Inc. v. Great W. Contractors, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8 
(Ct. App. 2008); Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Ct. App. 2002); 
Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997); Vallejo Dev. Co. v. Beck 
Dev. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 66. See Constr. Fin., LLC v. Perlite Plastering Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Ct. App. 1997) (three-
day evidentiary hearing followed by statement of decision); see also Cooper Crane & Rigging Inc. 
v. Pavex-Myers Joint Venture, No. C077272, 2017 WL 656762, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017) 
(trial court determined at pre-trial evidentiary hearing that subcontractor substantially complied 
with the CSLL and could pursue claims against the general contractor). 
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hearing.67 At least one opinion describes the trial court deciding the 
issue during the first phase of a bifurcated trial.68 
A pair of Second District Court of Appeal opinions show how 
abruptly the need for a subdivision (e) hearing might arise even in the 
advanced stages of litigation.69 The defendant in WSS Industrial 
Construction, Inc. v. Great West Contractors, Inc.70 moved for nonsuit 
at the close of plaintiff’s case because plaintiff’s own evidence showed 
it did not possess a contractor’s license when work began.71 This 
compelled the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing mid-trial to 
determine whether defendant’s case would proceed.72 The defendant 
in ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Superior Court73 did not invoke 
subdivision (e) until after plaintiff obtained $800,000 in damages at 
arbitration and petitioned to affirm the award.74 The trial court took 
the petition off calendar and re-opened evidence on plaintiff’s 
licensing problems.75 It ruled on the issue of substantial compliance 
after considering—and granting—defendant’s subsequent petition to 
vacate the award.76 
The First District Court of Appeal’s Judicial Council of 
California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc.77 is the only decision to explore 
the procedural parameters of a subdivision (e) hearing in earnest.78 
Defendant Jacobs provided maintenance services at plaintiff Judicial 
Council’s office building.79 Judicial Council sued for disgorgement 
after Jacobs allowed its license to lapse following a corporate 
 
 67. See, e.g., MW Erectors, Inc., 115 P.3d at 41 (lack of substantial compliance determined 
on summary adjudication; affirmed in part, reversed in part); Alatriste, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277 
(lack of substantial compliance determined on summary adjudication; affirmed); Opp v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260 (Ct. App. 2007) (lack of substantial compliance 
determined on summary judgment; affirmed); Pac. Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 94 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App. 2000) (lack of substantial compliance determined on summary 
judgment; affirmed in part). 
 68. See Zinchik v. Moore, No. A129548, 2011 WL 5128180, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 
2011). 
 69. See WSS Indus. Constr., Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 8; ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc. v. Superior 
Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 70. 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 71. Id. at 12. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 74. Id. at 89–90. 
 75. Id. at 90. 
 76. Id. at 89. 
 77. 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 78. Id. at 738–41. 
 79. Id. at 719. 
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restructuring.80 Jacobs requested a substantial compliance hearing, but 
the court decided to proceed with a jury trial first.81 The jury found in 
favor of Jacobs, which rendered Jacobs’ substantial compliance 
defense moot.82 
The court of appeal reversed and instructed the trial court to 
conduct “a full evidentiary hearing on the issues relevant to the 
elements of substantial compliance under subdivision (e).”83 It 
described the jury’s verdict in Jacobs’ favor “as an attempt to reach an 
equitable resolution, given the harsh consequences to defendants from 
the strict application of section 7031.”84 The substantial compliance 
doctrine, though now codified in a “restricted” form, remained an 
equitable issue for the court to decide rather than a legal issue for the 
jury.85 
The court rejected Judicial Council’s argument that Jacobs 
forfeited the right to a hearing by not renewing its request after trial.86 
It held Jacobs preserved this right by: (1) raising substantial 
compliance as an affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint; 
and (2) requesting the hearing before trial.87 It instructed the trial court 
to impose section 7031 penalties on remand only if it determined 
Jacobs failed to satisfy subdivision (e)’s factors.88 
IV.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LITIGANTS AND JUDICIAL 
OFFICERS CONFRONTING CONTRACTOR LICENSING ISSUES 
Codifying judicial substantial compliance factors tethered many 
of the doctrine’s original tenets to the CSLL’s policy aims. This 
legislative compromise eased the tension created by a law that 
expected judges to ignore their equitable instincts when enforcing an 
unduly punitive statute. Adding a disgorgement cause of action to 
 
 80. Id. at 721. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 718. 
 83. Id. at 738. 
 84. Id. at 737. 
 85. Id. at 728; see id. at 739 (“Reflecting trial courts’ similar understanding of this language, 
the statutory substantial compliance determinations reviewed in reported appellate decisions have 
been made by judges, rather than juries.”); see also id. at 741 (“Alternatively, as asserted by 
defendants in response to JCC’s claim for disgorgement, substantial compliance is an equitable 
defense to JCC’s claim. Either way, the doctrine is equitable in nature. Accordingly, defendants 
have no constitutional right to its determination by a jury.”). 
 86. Id. at 738. 
 87. Id. at 737–38. 
 88. Id. at 738, 741. 
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section 7031, however, transformed a historically defensive statute 
into an effective weapon for consumers. Counsel on both sides of the 
aisle in a construction dispute should survey the landscape for CSLL 
violations as their first order of business. As discussed above, neither 
subdivision (e)’s text nor case law gives contractors, consumers, or 
judicial officers procedural guidance if such violations come into play. 
This Part of the Article identifies the unique issues and opportunities 
the statute creates for each of these three groups. 
A.  Counsel for Contractors 
Counsel for contractors should advise their clients to delay or 
even forego collection actions on projects performed during periods 
when CSLL violations occurred—especially if the contractor 
collected significant amounts from the consumer. Initiating a lawsuit 
will invite a disgorgement cross-claim that could exceed the amount 
owed. The contractor should proceed only if confident that he or she 
can satisfy each of subdivision (e)’s substantial compliance factors at 
an evidentiary hearing.89 
1.  Evaluating the Contractor’s Substantial Compliance Defense 
Questions such as these will help counsel determine whether the 
client accused of violating the CSLL is likely to prevail under 
subdivision (e): 
• Does the contractor’s certified license history reflect 
a suspension or revocation? 
• If yes, did the suspension or revocation occur while 
the contractor was working on the project in dispute? 
• Did any of the contractor’s officers or employees 
know about the suspension or revocation? 
• If yes, when did the officer or employee first discover 
the suspension or revocation? 
 
 89. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020). Subdivision (e) states as follows 
at the time of writing: “[T]he court may determine that there has been substantial compliance with 
licensure requirements under this section if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person 
who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly licensed as 
a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in 
good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the 
failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.” Id. 
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• Did the Board send a written notice of suspension or 
revocation? What other communications and 
documents show what happened? 
• Did the contractor contact the Board to discuss the 
issue? By phone? Email? 
• What steps did the contractor take to fix the issue? 
• Which of the contractor’s officers or employees were 
responsible for maintaining the entity’s license? 
• Has any consumer filed a complaint with the Board 
in the past five years? 
• If yes, did that complaint result in Board discipline for the 
contractor? 
The last two questions raise particularly important concerns. Civil 
cases between a contractor and consumer often run parallel with Board 
disciplinary proceedings arising from the same dispute. This usually 
occurs when the consumer files a complaint against the contractor with 
the Board before or during litigation. The Board may refer the 
complaint to the Attorney General for accusation—i.e., formal 
administrative proceedings—after investigating the complaint.90 
Contracting with a suspended license is cause for Board discipline on 
top of any civil or criminal penalties the contractor could face for those 
violations.91 The findings of the administrative tribunal may have 
collateral estoppel effects which, for better or worse, may influence 
the trial court’s substantial compliance determination.92 For this 
reason, counsel should advise contractor clients to defer collection 
actions until they resolve pending Board complaints or accusation 
proceedings.93 
 
 90. See Id. §§ 7090–7124.6. 
 91. See id. § 7114.2 (“Any licensed or unlicensed person who commits any act prohibited by 
Section 119 is subject to the administrative remedies authorized by this chapter. Unless otherwise 
expressly provided, the remedies authorized under this section shall be separate from, and in 
addition to, all other available remedies, whether civil or criminal.”); see also id. § 7117.5(b) 
(contracting with a suspended license constitutes cause for discipline). 
 92. See Pac. Lumber Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 126 P.3d 1040, 1054–55 (Cal. 2006) 
(findings of an administrative agency may have collateral estoppel effect if the proceedings were 
of a “judicial character”); People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1982) (holding that welfare hearing 
was “judicial” in nature; parties permitted to subpoena, examine and cross-examine witnesses under 
oath, and present oral and written argument; hearing officer issued written ruling that applied law 
to the facts of the case). 
 93. California’s four-year limitations period for breach of written contract under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 337 should accommodate such proceedings under most circumstances. 
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2.  Identifying Potential CSLL Violations That May Lead to 
Suspension of a Contractor’s License as a Matter of Law 
A contractor is not out of the woods because his or her license 
history does not reflect a suspension or revocation. Courts may 
suspend a contractor’s license as a matter of law if the evidence shows 
a contractor violated the CSLL. This happens most commonly in two 
situations. The first is when an owner-contractor is caught evading 
workers’ compensation requirements by falsely claiming he or she has 
no employees.94 The second is when a contractor does not notify the 
Board of an unpaid money judgment within ninety days.95 A similar 
problem could occur if the client’s $15,000 contractor’s bond is not 
renewed.96 Therefore, counsel should confirm the contractor 
consistently maintained its bond and workers’ compensation coverage 
over the relevant period, or, if claiming exemption on the latter, that 
the contractor completed the project without employees or workers 
paid “under the table.” Counsel should also ask whether the client was 
a party to any legal proceedings in the preceding four or five years, 
and if so, confirm no reportable judgments exist. 
3.  Representing the Contractor Sued by a Consumer Alleging CSLL 
Violations 
A contractor cannot delay or forego litigation when the consumer 
sues first. If the complaint alleges a licensing violation, the contractor 
must raise substantial compliance as an affirmative defense in its 
 
 94. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7125.2 (“The failure of a licensee to obtain or maintain 
workers’ compensation insurance coverage, if required under this chapter, shall result in the 
automatic suspension of the license by operation of law in accordance with the provisions of this 
section . . . .”); see Wright v. Issak, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding a contractor’s 
license suspended by operation of law when he systematically underreported payroll to avoid 
purchasing workers’ compensation insurance). 
 95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7071.17 (“[T]he board shall require . . . that an applicant, 
previously found to have failed or refused to pay a contractor, subcontractor, consumer, materials 
supplier, or employee based on an unsatisfied final judgment, file or have on file with the board a 
bond sufficient to guarantee payment of an amount equal to the unsatisfied final judgment or 
judgments. The applicant shall have 90 days from the date of notification by the board to file the 
bond or the application shall become void.”); see Pac. Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros. 
Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337 (Ct. App. 2015) (affirming a finding that contractor did not substantially 
comply with CSLL when the Board suspended its license for failing to notify the Board of unpaid 
judgment). 
 96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7071.6(a) (“The board shall require as a condition precedent 
to the issuance, reinstatement, reactivation, renewal, or continued maintenance of a license, that the 
applicant or licensee file or have on file a contractor’s bond in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars 
($15,000).”). 
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answer to avoid waiver.97 While Jacobs Facilities held the contractor 
could request a subdivision (e) as late as trial call, counsel should 
consider broaching the topic during the initial case management 
conference.98 This will enable the parties and court to discuss whether 
to resolve the issue of substantial compliance before starting 
construction defect discovery or other resource intensive activities. 
Counsel can also discern whether the assigned judge is familiar with 
the CSLL, and to ask whether he or she would accept supplemental 
briefing on the subject or a proposed case management order 
describing how the matter should proceed. 
4.  Representing the Contractor That Insists on Suing a Consumer 
Despite CSLL Violations 
The contractor client with license issues may nevertheless elect 
to proceed with collection despite the risk of dismissal or a retaliatory 
cross-claim for disgorgement. The priority in these circumstances is 
to properly plead the contractor’s claim while preserving the 
substantial compliance defense in the event of a section 7031 
challenge. 
The initial hurdle is the requirement that a contractor allege he or 
she “was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance 
of that act or contract” for which he or she seeks payment.99 Failing to 
do so exposes the contractor’s complaint to demurrer.100 Case law 
does not address how a contractor with a past suspension or 
revocation, but who believes he or she substantially complied with the 
CSLL, can truthfully allege to have been “duly licensed” at all 
times.101 Pleading as follows may satisfy both the pleading 
requirement and the contractor’s duty of candor to the court: 
The Contractors State License Board issued plaintiff general 
building contractor license number 991850 on September 9, 
2015. Plaintiff’s license remained active at all times relevant 
to this action except that period of suspension between 
November 13, 2019 and December 1, 2019. Plaintiff alleges 
 
 97. See Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 737–38 (Ct. App. 
2015). 
 98. See id. 
 99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a). 
 100. See Fraenkel v. Trescony, 309 P.2d 819, 823 (Cal. 1957) (“[P]laintiff, as an unlicensed 
contractor, was properly held to be precluded from maintaining the present action.”). 
 101. Id. at 824 (Schauer, J., dissenting). 
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it substantially complied with licensure requirements under 
Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (e) 
despite this period of suspension, and hereby requests an 
evidentiary hearing on that issue prior to entry of judgment. 
A more succinct allegation like the following may also enable the 
contractor to survive a pleading challenge: 
“Plaintiff alleges it substantially complied with contractor 
licensure requirements under Business and Professions Code section 
7031, subdivision (e), and hereby requests an evidentiary hearing on 
that issue prior to entry of judgment.” 
In summary, counsel should explain to contractor clients how 
severely the CSLL punishes licensing gaps. The briefest suspension 
may prove fatal if the contractor cannot piece together a credible 
factual narrative that satisfies subdivision (e)’s three-factor test. 
Counsel should encourage the contractor to divulge all 
communications and documents relating to the mistake or oversight to 
counsel. In addition, counsel should advise leadership not to blame or 
discipline employees whose conduct precipitated the suspension—a 
mail clerk who misfiled a money judgment, for example—but rather 
instruct them to cooperate with counsel’s investigation to fix the 
mistake. A loyal and penitent employee’s testimony can serve as the 
centerpiece of the contractor’s substantial compliance defense. 
B.  Counsel for Consumers 
Section 7031 remains a powerful weapon for consumers. A 
consumer facing a contractor’s collection lawsuit quickly gains the 
upper hand if he or she can cast a shadow over the contractor’s license 
status. The statute provides one of the few opportunities under 
California law for a litigant to prevail regardless of the strength of their 
opponent’s claims and defenses, or the weakness of their own. 
1.  Finding a Violation 
Counsel for the consumer should check a contractor’s license 
status as soon as a dispute arises. The Board’s online “Check a 
License” database provides immediate access to basic data about all 
licenses issued since the 1940s.102 This includes a contractor’s current 
 
 102. Check a Contractor License or Home Improvement Salesperson (HIS) Registration, 
CA.GOV, https://www.cslb.ca.gov/onlineservices/checklicenseII/checklicense.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2020). 
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license status, pending and past discipline, bond information, and the 
contractor’s workers’ compensation insurance or claim of 
exemption.103 Counsel should also request a certified license 
history.104 This will indicate whether the Board revoked or suspended 
a license in the past and whether the contractor maintained the required 
insurance and bond throughout its existence.105 If counsel discovers 
an anomaly—particularly a suspension or revocation during the time 
the contractor worked for the consumer—counsel should contact the 
Board’s consumer hotline to confirm whether the information 
provided in these public resources is correct. 
2.  Violations Appearing on a Contractor’s License Record 
The degree to which a consumer can leverage his or her 
contractor’s CSLL violation depends on the violation’s timing and 
severity. Most vulnerable to attack is a contractor that began working 
on a project without an active license. This often occurs when a 
contractor accepts work while waiting for the Board to process his or 
her initial application and expecting to receive a license mid-
project.106 If sued, the contractor cannot establish the first substantial 
compliance factor, i.e., that it was licensed “prior to the performance 
of the act or contract.”107 Likewise, the contractor cannot maintain a 
cross-claim against the consumer because he or she cannot allege he 
or she “was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the 
performance.”108 Defending the action or pursuing a collection claim 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Form, Request for Certified License History, Contractors State License Bd., State of 
Cal. (last revised Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.cslb.ca.gov/Resources/FormsAndApplications/Req
uestForCertifiedLicenseHistoryVerifiedCertificate.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Twenty-Nine Palms Enters. Corp. v. Bardos, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52 (Ct. App. 
2012) (finding the owner of a contracting entity did not substantially comply with CSLL because 
he did not apply for license when contract was signed and work commenced). 
 107. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020) (“[T]he court may determine that 
there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown 
at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a 
contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the 
act or contract.” (emphasis added)). But see Brown v. Solano Cnty. Bus. Dev., Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 
700 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding a contractor satisfied first substantial compliance factor even though 
license lapsed shortly after he began performing contract; pre-statute case); Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado 
Ice Palace, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1973) (finding a contractor who received his license 
after signing contract, but before starting work, could demonstrate substantial compliance; pre-
statute case). 
 108. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a). 
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is futile. Counsel for the consumer can negotiate a prompt and 
favorable settlement under these circumstances. If the contractor plods 
ahead regardless, the consumer can file a demurrer to the complaint 
and request judicial notice of the contractor’s license history.109 
Counsel should also consider filing a preemptive request for 
evidentiary hearing concurrently with the demurrer. This will place 
the contractor on notice of subdivision (e) and provide an opportunity 
to gather evidence about its license, thereby foreclosing an appeal on 
the grounds the court did not provide an evidentiary hearing before 
entering judgment of dismissal.110 
3.  Mid-Project Suspensions and Violations Not Appearing on a 
Contractor’s License Record 
A consumer’s section 7031 challenge is more complicated if the 
contractor loses its license mid-project or if the consumer bases its 
challenge on a CSLL violation that does not appear on the contractor’s 
license record. As discussed earlier, a contractor can plead around 
mid-project license gaps in its complaint or answer by alleging 
substantial compliance. A consumer seeking to revoke the contractor’s 
license as a matter of law—by proving the contractor falsely claimed 
exemption from workers’ compensation requirements, for example—
will need to shepherd evidence supporting this theory.111 Such fact-
intensive inquiries are often resolved by summary adjudication and 
summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure 437c.112 This is a 
lengthy and expensive process. A party can file its motion no sooner 
than sixty days after the opposing party appears in the action.113 The 
 
 109. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.30(a) (“When any ground for objection to a complaint, 
cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is 
required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer 
to the pleading.” (emphasis added)). 
 110. See Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 737–38 (Ct. App. 
2015) (finding a contractor entitled to full evidentiary hearing prior to entry of judgment on 
disgorgement claim). 
 111. See Wright v. Issak, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2007); Zinchik v. Moore, No. A129548, 
2011 WL 5128180, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011). But see Loranger v. Jones, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 120 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to suspend contractor’s license by operation of law where 
homeowners alleged their contractor used unreported employees on job site and sought 
disgorgement under Business and Professions Code sections 7125.2 and 7031 subdivision (b) 
because contractor possessed workers’ compensation; showing discrepancies in contractor’s 
payroll reports to workers’ compensation insurer did not constitute a failure to obtain insurance 
under section 7125.2). 
 112. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a). 
 113. Id. 
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consumer would need to provide the contractor at least seventy-five 
days’ notice and prepare a notice of motion, a motion, points and 
authorities, separate statement, supporting declarations, compendium 
of exhibits, and any request(s) for judicial notice.114 
A substantial compliance evidentiary hearing can serve as a more 
efficient alternative. Nothing in subdivision (e) prevents the consumer 
rather than the contractor from initiating the evidentiary hearing 
process and pursuing pre-trial relief under section 7031 before 
litigating other issues. Resolving license-related issues earlier serves 
the consumer’s interests, especially if the consumer has a meritorious 
CSLL claim, but cannot front the fees and costs associated with a 
traditional dispositive motion. The contractor’s due process rights are 
likewise protected because he or she is afforded the “full evidentiary 
hearing” contemplated by Jacobs Facilities.115 
C.  Judicial Officers 
Section 7031’s legislative history and annotations encourage 
courts to view subdivision (e)’s “evidentiary hearing” as a concept 
rather than a rigid procedural mandate.116 The hearing represents the 
need to guard contractors’ due process rights when the CSLL affords 
consumers every advantage. The dearth of procedural guidance allows 
judicial officers to confront licensing issues in a manner best suited to 
the circumstances. The challenge faced today is the same faced by 
Chief Justice Gibson’s court in Gatti and Chief Justice Tobriner’s 
court in Latipac—how to discern which violations deserve the CSLL’s 
severe penalties and which deserve leniency.117 The legislature’s 1993 
amendments to section 7031 tacitly acknowledged California’s courts 
are better suited to make these nuanced determinations. 
1.  Preliminary Considerations When Confronted with Contractor 
Licensing Issues 
When a litigant raises an opponent’s potential licensing violation, 
the court should first determine if the issue might resolve the case in 
whole or in part. A half-day subdivision (e) hearing conducted 
 
 114. Id. § 437c(a)–(b); see also Cal. R. Ct. R. 3.1350. 
 115. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 737–38. 
 116. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e) (Deering 2020). 
 117. Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 166 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1946); Latipac, Inc. v. Superior 
Ct., 411 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1966). 
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concurrently with a demurrer hearing, for example, may suffice if the 
contractor’s license history reflects a brief suspension caused by a 
simple office error. Eliciting the testimony of a handful of witnesses 
might produce an evidentiary record sufficient to rule fairly. An early 
finding of substantial compliance with the CSLL would permit the 
parties to move forward on the case’s remaining claims and defenses 
without wondering if a subsequent ruling will render those matters 
moot. Conversely, finding the contractor did not comply could narrow 
the case by jettisoning the contractor’s claims or even dispose of the 
case entirely. As discussed above, the initial case management 
conference provides an opportunity for the court and litigants to 
discuss how alleged CSLL violations may impact the case and whether 
a subdivision (e) hearing is needed. 
2.  Discovery Relating to Substantial Compliance 
Less clear-cut CSLL violations may require the parties to conduct 
discovery before jumping into an evidentiary hearing. The court 
should limit the subject matter of such discovery to evidence relevant 
to (1) the alleged violation or violations; (2) how the violation or 
violations affected the contractor’s license, e.g., a suspension between 
dates X and date Y; and (3) whether the contractor satisfied subdivision 
(e)’s three-factor test. The court should specify in its case management 
order or stipulated discovery order that such restrictions do not reduce 
the number of written discovery requests available to the parties under 
the Discovery Act or prevent them from re-deposing witnesses who 
testified about the issues above.118 The order should schedule a status 
conference at which the parties can discuss the progress of CSLL 
discovery, identify the key factual issues the court must resolve, 
estimate how much time the parties will need to present their evidence, 
and agree on the date for the subdivision (e) hearing. 
3.  The Subdivision (e) Hearing as an Alternative to Summary 
Judgment or Adjudication 
As discussed above, section 7031’s annotations show courts 
frequently use summary judgment or adjudication to decide 
 
 118. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2025.290(a) (setting seven-hour maximum for oral deposition 
of a witness); Id. § 2030.030 (limiting parties to thirty-five specially prepared interrogatories in 
unlimited civil matters); id. § 2033.030(a) (limiting parties to thirty-five requests for admission 
relating to “matters that do not relate to the genuineness of documents”). 
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substantial compliance. Inertia may explain this fact. Courts and 
litigants seem to assume they must fire up the cumbersome but 
familiar machinery of section 437c if they want to resolve a claim or 
defense before trial.119 However, subdivision (e)’s use of the phrase 
“shown at an evidentiary hearing” rather than “shown at trial” 
indicates the legislature did not contemplate dispositive motions or 
trial as the exclusive means of adjudicating substantial compliance.120 
The statute’s laconic text invites judicial officers to shed the Code of 
Civil Procedure’s rigid conventions and to handle the issue like a 
chancellor in equity. 
Further, two provisions of section 437c appear to conflict with 
section 7031. First, section 437c requires the parties to submit all 
supporting evidence in advance of hearing, whereas subdivision (e) 
provides for the parties to present evidence at hearing.121 The parties 
moving and opposing summary judgment or adjudication must submit 
evidence by way of affidavit or judicial notice and cannot use live 
testimony “unless the court orders otherwise for good cause 
shown.”122 In contrast, subdivision (e) does not mention pre-hearing 
filings or even the need to proceed by noticed motion under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1005. Second, different burdens apply under 
each statute. Section 437c places the initial burden of proof on the 
movant, whether plaintiff or defendant, and shifts the burden only after 
the movant has proven a lack of triable issue of material fact as to the 
subject claim or defense.123 Section 7031 requires the contractor—
never the consumer—to prove licensure whenever the issue is 
controverted.124 As such, the court should clarify each side’s burdens 
in advance if the parties decide to proceed by dispositive motion under 
 
 119. See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. 2001) (“The purpose of [§ 437c] . . . 
is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine 
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”). 
 120. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e). 
 121. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a)–(b), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(e). 
 122. Cal. R. Ct. R. 3.1306(a). 
 123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(p). 
 124. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (“Nothing in this subdivision shall require any person 
or entity controverting licensure or proper licensure to produce a verified certificate. When 
licensure or proper licensure is controverted, the burden of proof to establish licensure or proper 
licensure shall be on the licensee.”); see Womack v. Lovell, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480 (Ct. App. 
2015) (“Assembly Bill No. 628 . . . clarified that contractors still had the burden of proving 
licensure and there was no need for persons they were suing for compensation to produce the 
verified certificate.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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section 437c in lieu of, or in addition to, exhibits and testimony at a 
separate substantial compliance hearing. 
4.  Evidentiary Hearings and Disgorgement Awards 
One area not yet explored by case law is how section 7031 
subdivision (b)’s disgorgement remedy dovetails with subdivision 
(e)’s hearing requirement. Finding a contractor substantially complied 
with the CSLL despite a license lapse would presumably dispose of a 
consumer’s disgorgement claim entirely. The opposite finding would 
confirm the defendant’s status as an “unlicensed contractor” under 
subdivision (b) and would entitle the consumer to disgorgement as a 
matter of law, with only the amount of disgorgement left for the court 
to determine.125 Jacobs Facilities did not suggest any further 
proceedings were required to impose section 7031’s penalties once the 
contractor obtained the requested hearing.126 Compelling the 
consumer to take the additional step of moving for summary 
adjudication or proceeding to trial on its disgorgement claim seems 
needless, and further, could easily cost the consumer more than the 
award itself—especially because section 7031 does not provide for an 
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party.127 
The court should consider taking evidence at the hearing about 
the amounts the consumer paid to the contractor and the timing of 
those payments. This will enable the court to calculate a disgorgement 
award if the contractor fails to show substantial compliance.128 
5.  Hearings During or After Trial 
Resolving substantial compliance in advance of trial is not always 
necessary or better, especially when the contractor does not seek to 
collect from the consumer. The evidence presented by the parties in a 
consumer’s action for construction defect or fraud, for example, may 
overlap in significant part with evidence related to substantial 
compliance. The parties may prefer not to spend time and money on 
an evidentiary hearing when the monetary damages sought by the 
 
 125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b). 
 126. Jud. Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 741 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(instructing trial court to enter judgment for disgorgement figure sought by plaintiff if defendant 
did not demonstrate statutory substantial compliance after hearing on remand). 
 127. Id. (“Unless the prevailing party can demonstrate a valid basis for an award of attorney 
fees other than those already asserted by the Jacobs entities, it shall not be awarded attorney fees.”). 
 128. See discussion infra Part V regarding the calculation of disgorgement. 
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consumer greatly exceed the potential subdivision (b) claim or might 
be swallowed by offset. In those circumstances, the court may 
consider bifurcating trial so evidence relevant only to substantial 
compliance—a purely equitable issue—is heard before or after the 
jury trial, or outside the presence of jurors altogether.129 The court 
could then rule on the disgorgement claim or take the matter under 
submission at the close of evidence. 
V.  LOOKING AHEAD 
Subdivision (e)’s evidentiary hearing embodies a compromise 
between the legislature’s police powers and the judiciary’s equitable 
powers. While section 7031 served one master during its first five 
decades—the consumer—the legislature’s 1992 amendments 
repurposed the statute as a mechanism the courts can use to balance 
the interests of both consumers and contractors. The legislature’s 
frequent amendments since that time reveal the delicacy of this 
balance. One proposing yet more changes to the law must take care 
not to tip the scales with well-intended “improvements.” Subdivision 
(e)’s austere text and procedural flexibility may be one of its greatest 
strengths. That said, the following three issues deserve the 
legislature’s attention should it consider amending the statute. 
First, section 7031 should address how a substantial compliance 
determination under subdivision (e) impacts a case in which the 
consumer seeks disgorgement under subdivision (b). The original 
statute provided the consumer with a purely defensive remedy, i.e., a 
pleading challenge that robbed the plaintiff contractor of its standing 
to sue the consumer. The doctrine and its statutory successor 
developed in response to this defensive remedy. When the legislature 
added a disgorgement remedy in subdivision (b) it neglected to 
synthesize the provision with subdivision (e). The court’s ruling at a 
subdivision (e) hearing may not end the matter but in fact raise new 
 
 129. Jacobs Facilities dedicated a significant part of its analysis to the equitable nature of 
substantial compliance and the court’s obligation to resolve the issue separately from the parties’ 
legal claims if tried together. See Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 740 (“Whichever 
approach is adopted, equitable issues retain their character, despite being raised in the context of a 
legal claim. A litigant has no constitutional right to a jury determination of an equitable issue merely 
because it is raised in the context of a claim at law.”). This distinction is not always easy to discern. 
See Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 438 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a jury 
decision whether contractor used a “sham” responsible managing employee as qualifying 
individual impacted contractor’s license status and substantial compliance with CSLL). 
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questions. For example, should the court dismiss the consumer’s 
disgorgement claim immediately if it finds the contractor substantially 
complied? Should it enter a directed verdict for the consumer if it finds 
the contractor did not, then immediately proceed to take evidence on 
the correct amount of disgorgement? 
Second, in the event the legislature blends or coordinates 
subdivisions (b) and (e) to allow for a summary disgorgement 
procedure, it should clarify the degree of discretion the court may 
exercise when deciding the amount a contractor must disgorge if he or 
she cannot show substantial compliance. This issue comes to the fore 
when the case involves a mid-project lapse. The current subdivision 
(b) allows the consumer to “recover all compensation paid to the 
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”130 On 
one hand, the court could interpret this as requiring a contractor with 
a brief license lapse to disgorge all amounts received over the course 
of the entire project. On the other hand, the court could interpret this 
as requiring a contractor to disgorge only those amounts paid during 
the lapse. 
Third, section 7031 appears to relieve the consumer of their 
burden to prove its right to disgorgement by requiring the contractor 
to disprove the consumer’s licensing allegations. Failing to do so leads 
to a near-certain disgorgement judgment. The statute should clarify 
the consumer’s obligation to establish the appropriate amount of 
disgorgement in the event the contractor cannot demonstrate 
substantial compliance under subdivision (e). 
The following proposed amendments to subdivisions (b), (d), and 
(e) may enable these provisions to work better in concert: 
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (e), a person who 
utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an 
action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to 
recover all that portion of compensation paid to the 
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract 
while unlicensed. 
 . . . 
(d) If licensure or proper licensure is controverted, then proof 
of licensure pursuant to this section shall be made by 
production of a verified certificate of licensure from the 
 
 130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7031(b). 
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Contractors’ State License Board which establishes that the 
individual or entity bringing the action was duly licensed in 
the proper classification of contractors at all times during the 
performance of any act or contract covered by the action. 
Nothing in this subdivision shall require any person or entity 
controverting licensure or proper licensure to produce a 
verified certificate. When licensure or proper licensure is 
controverted, the burden of proof to establish licensure or 
proper licensure shall be on the licensee. Any person seeking 
to recover compensation under subdivision (e) shall have the 
burden of proof to establish the appropriate amount of 
compensation paid to the contractor while unlicensed. 
 . . . 
(e) The judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not 
apply under this section where the person who engaged in the 
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor has never 
been a duly licensed contractor in this state. However, 
notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 143, the court 
may determine that there has been substantial compliance 
with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown 
at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the 
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been 
duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the 
performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and 
in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted 
promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply 
with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure. 
The court may, in its discretion, adjudicate the contractor’s 
liability for disgorgement under subdivision (b) concurrently 
with the issue of the contractor’s substantial compliance 
under this subdivision. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Codifying the judicial substantial compliance doctrine eased a 
decades-long tug-of-war between California’s legislative and judicial 
branches. Permitting courts to exercise their equitable discretion 
within a well-defined legal framework enables California to maintain 
a hard line against unlicensed contracting without punishing those 
whose licensing problems resulted from good faith errors. The 
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evidentiary hearing under subdivision (e) allows litigants and judicial 
officers to blend law and equity, and in doing so, to resolve contractor 
licensing issues promptly and efficiently. The handful of minor 
revisions proposed here would clarify the statute’s ambiguities and 



































(10) 54.2_REED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/21  9:52 AM 
586 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:555 
 
